

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Abstract: In World War II, the Army trained, equipped, and deployed almost 90 divisions worldwide, but was desperately short out of infantryman in early 1945. While ten percent of the American population consisted of African Americans, less than three percent of the Black units that deployed overseas were combat units and very few of those outfits fought, or fought for long, on the front lines. Still, proximity matters, and the crucible of close combat in Europe offered the opportunity for a few thousand Black soldiers to demonstrate their value as fighting men. When these soldiers, all volunteers from the Army Service Forces, fought side-by-side with White troops during the Battle of the Bulge and afterward, they began to change the minds of some of their harshest White critics and started a shift that would eventually lead to full integration of the Army. With the U.S. Army and other services facing a severe drop in end strength due to the physical and intellectual inability of recruits to meet basic standards, the case of the missing World War II Black combat soldier offers lessons for today's military faced with similar issues of diversity, equity, and inclusion.

Where were all the WWII Black Combat Soldiers?

What sounds like the opening to a very poor joke is really an interesting, but disturbing historical question. My search for the missing Black combat soldier evolved from research into African American Antiaircraft Artillery units. What I found startled me, upended the historical record, and demonstrated the value of inclusion in changing perceptions and stereotypes.

Over 12 million Americans, including 900,000 African Americans, served in the World War II Army. While hundreds of thousands of Blacks deployed to North Africa, Italy, Europe, and the Pacific, very few—only three percent of African American units—were combat outfits, and even fewer actually fought in combat. Why did this happen when even President Roosevelt directed that 10% of all Army units would be Black?

At a glance, the answer seems obvious. First, African Americans made up approximately 10% of the American population, but 75 years after the Civil War and several Constitutional Amendments abolishing slavery and guaranteeing equality and the right to vote, the White American majority still did not consider Blacks as their equal in fighting spirit . . . or anything else.

Second, while great strides had been made in the education of the Black population since the Civil War, and especially since WWI, the lingering effects of segregation, economic and social marginalization, and access to quality schools meant that Black learned intelligence, as measured by the Army General Classification Test (AGCT), lagged behind that of Whites and reinforced their belief that Blacks were not smart enough to fight a modern war.

Third, these beliefs dovetailed into conflicted attitudes and tensions of racial subordination and superordination within the disequilibrated system of race relations present in American society at the time. And because the WWII Army consisted of mostly White men with decades of socially-sanctioned prejudice ingrained in their psyche, the World War II Army systematically discriminated against African Americans and established an apartheid-like segregation of Black servicemen despite Presidential directives to do otherwise. While publicly the national attitude toward Blacks and other minorities may have been “separate, but equal,” the Army treated Black men and Black units as “unequal and keep separate.”

In short, World War II was a White Man’s war; others need not apply.

* * *

Eye Opening

To understand this situation, however, requires some historical perspective. Despite African Americans having served with distinction in every war since the Revolution, when Congress passed the Selective Service Act in September 1940, there were 4,435 Black enlisted men, 5 commissioned officers, and 11 warrant officers in an Army of 269,023.[1] Shortly thereafter, more than 2.5 million African Americans registered for the draft in 1940, about half were inducted, 75 percent of which went into the Army.[2] During the war, the Army referred to the over 901,896 African Americans that served as "Negro personnel" and segregated them into "colored" outfits, which were delineated in some Army records by the parenthetical (Colored) or the abbreviation (Cld) as in 452nd Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion (Colored) or 452nd AAA (AW) Bn (Cld).[3] By modern standards, this policy seems extremely antiquated, but it reflected the societal attitudes and norms of the time.

While not to the same degree, the Army treated women and other minorities similarly.[4] The prevailing attitude was that White men made the best soldiers and should provide the preponderance of combat forces. To the extent that Blacks—or Hispanics, Filipinos, or women—entered the force, it was both the result of political pressure and to relieve White men of less meaningful tasks so they could fight at the front. The Army had no issue with enlisting Blacks, Puerto Ricans, or Filipinos as long as they were in separate units. In fact, in 1940-41 with the Japanese occupying northern Indo-China (today Vietnam) and preparing for a likely war with America, the Army went so far as to refuse to allow Filipinos to enlist except in the Philippine Scouts or in units stationed in Philippines that would accept them.[5] *Borinqueños* were sent to units in Puerto Rico, as in the 123rd Antiaircraft Artillery (Gun) Battalion, which the Army formed out of a Puerto Rican National Guard Coast Artillery Regiment and moved between Puerto Rico and Trinidad during the war.[6] The largest and most politically active group, however, were African Americans.

At its peak in June 1945, the Army totaled 8,266,373 men, of which 694,818 (9.33%) were Black.[7] During the war years, African Americans represented about 10% of the American population. It was the goal of African American leaders to mirror this percentage in the number of Blacks inducted into the Army, but for a number of reasons including overall education, the availability of Black leaders to serve as NCOs and officers, and prejudicial attitudes about the worthiness of Black units, the Army did not reach this percentage of its enlisted strength until December 1945, four months after the Japanese surrender.[8] These factors also influenced the distribution of Black servicemen among the Army's various branches, driving the allocation of African Americans out of combat units (Armor, Cavalry, Coast/Antiaircraft Artillery, Field Artillery, and Infantry) and into Service branches. Some sources note that "most" African Americans served in non-combat units.[9] This understates the matter significantly. Recent analysis indicates that with few exceptions virtually all African-American soldiers served in combat support or service units, mostly as laborers, drivers, mechanics, and quartermasters.

In 1942, 48% of Blacks were in the Army Service Forces at a time when the ASF made up only 29% of the Army. By mid-1945, 75% of Black servicemen were in ASF units, which then constituted 39% of the force.[10] Despite this imbalance, some African Americans did end up in combat units, including three of 89 divisions (two infantry and one cavalry division), a few tank, tank destroyer, engineer, and artillery battalions, and approximately seven percent (41 of the 599) antiaircraft artillery (AAA) battalions created during the war.[11] Not all of these units, however, deployed overseas or deployed as combat units. In fact, the Army converted several dozen Black battalions to service units beginning in mid-1943. The primary reason given for this conversion was a significant shortage of service and support personnel.

The rationale frequently offered for selecting African American units for conversion was the shortage of suitable Black cadres from which to build Black combat units. In an extreme example of conversion, in August 1943 the Army Service Forces (ASF) requested and received 60,000 men (approximately three infantry divisions worth) from newly formed and unfilled units, over half which were African American. To meet a portion of this requirement, the Army culled 21,000 officers and men from its various headquarters, while the Army Ground Forces (AGF), the fighting arm of the Army, stripped 80 percent of the enlisted personnel (14,288 total) from 31 African American combat units—13 antiaircraft, 10 field artillery, and 8 tank destroyer battalions. As was seemingly its pattern regarding personnel management, the Army later refilled a few of these units and sent them overseas in their original capacity.[12]

Notwithstanding the need for more Service Troops, the underlying cause of this shift was the attitude that Whites and White leadership had toward Black troops. Indeed, the Army's senior leadership, as well as its collective conscience, held a very low opinion of the fighting abilities of the African American soldier. This attitude grew from a toxic mix of racial prejudice and the conclusions of World War I senior and junior officers; yes, *WWI officers*. The attitudes of WWI senior officers influenced the opinions of the junior officers, *who by 1940 ran the WWII Army*.[13]

To understand further, it is necessary to go back two decades. For although African Americans had fought with distinction both as individuals and as units prior to 1917, when the U.S. entered World War I, the Army could muster four understrength Black Regular Army regiments—two Cavalry and two Infantry—none of which did General John J. Pershing, Commander of the Army Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.), pull to France. Some of these men served as cadre for Black units built with draftees, but mostly the Army used these experienced regiments to guard the Mexican border or American possessions in the Caribbean or Pacific. In total, over 400,000 African Americans served in the U.S. Armed Forces in WWI, with Blacks accounting for 13 percent of the total men drafted—this at a time when the Black population of the US was just over 10 percent.[14]

Despite their outsized representation in the Army, African-American soldiers made up just 3 percent of the combat forces in Pershing's A.E.F. Of the roughly 200,000 Blacks that served in France, nearly 80 percent did so in service units. Of the other 20-odd percent, approximately 42,000, most served in either the 92nd or 93rd Infantry Divisions. Of the two divisions, the 92nd

was a full division complete with combat service and support units. It fought so poorly in the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign (September 26 – October 3, 1918) that its commander, Major General Charles Ballou, tried to court-martial 30 Black junior officers. Even the commander of the American Second Army, Lieutenant General Robert L. Bullard, a man with experience leading Black troops in the Spanish-American War, personally intervened and could not seem to improve the unit's overall performance. The cause of the division's poor performance is less important than the impression it left on White senior and junior officers. After the war, Ballou, who displayed a schizophrenic attitude toward Blacks, would comment "that 'the average negro' was a 'rank coward' in night combat, 'the natural result of environment and education . . . '" while Bullard wrote that "If you need combat soldiers . . . don't put your time upon Negros."[15]

The other unit, the 93rd Division, really consisted of four separate regiments. It never fought as a single unit. Instead, General Pershing, not having much faith in African Americans, happily gave the individual regiments to the French Army, which reorganized, clothed, equipped, and integrated them into French divisions. Perhaps proving that leaders get the performance they expect, all four regiments fought with distinction. In total, they suffered 3,100 casualties, but won three *Croix de Guerre* unit citations (369th, 371st, and 372nd Infantry Regiments) along with a host of individual French awards. During the war, the commander of the French 157th Division, General Mariano F. J. Goybet, wrote to the commanders of the 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments extolling the bravery and performance of their units.[16] The 370th Regiment performed similarly well under the French 59th Division and the Tenth French Army. But of all the regiments, the 369th Infantry Regiment, was the most notable. Known contemporaneously as the "Men of Bronze" and historically as the Harlem Hellcats, it was led by Colonel William Hayward, a White officer who treated the soldiers with respect and provided for their welfare. Upon arriving in France, the Regiment spent two and a half months as laborers before being dispatched by Pershing to the French in March 1918. In 191 days of continuous combat—longer perhaps than any American regiment—the 369th Infantry Regiment withstood ferocious Germans attacks as part of the last-ditch Ludendorff offensives and won acclaim from the French. Plagued by a poor A.E.F. personnel system that dropped off hundreds of untrained Black replacements unannounced on its back door, the 369th Infantry Regiment "fought itself to exhaustion" trying to combat the Germans while simultaneously integrating and training essentially raw recruits. In over six months at the front, the Regiment suffered some 1,300 casualties.[17] Ironically, having treated the Black regiments with indifference since their arrival in France, Pershing's headquarters tried toward the end of the war to obtain the return of the regiments to use the men as laborers only to be rebuffed by the French. In early 1919, the 369th Regiment departed for New York. Having been barred from participating in the City's 1917 farewell parade for the 42nd Infantry Division, which given its diverse composition was nicknamed the Rainbow Division, ostensibly because "black was not a color in the Rainbow," the 369th Infantry Regiment returned in early 1919 to a hero's welcome and participated in a victory parade through Harlem and all the way down Fifth Avenue.[18] In World War II, the Army's best Black Infantry unit would deploy

to Hawaii as the 369th Antiaircraft Regiment before being reorganized in December 1943 into two antiaircraft battalions—the 369th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion and the 870th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, both of which would deploy to combat in the Pacific.[19] Colonel Hayward accurately summarized Pershing's attitude toward the Black units when he wrote to a friend that "our great American general simply put the Black orphan in a basket, set it on the doorstep of the French, pulled the bell, and went away."[20]

This attitude toward African Americans was pervasive in the A.E.F. and not lost on Captain George S. Patton or Colonel George C. Marshall, both of whom served on Pershing's staff. Patton was Pershing's aide for a time and in World War II was known for being notoriously hard on African American units. Pershing selected Marshall to serve on his staff where he was instrumental in the planning of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, and no doubt knew both of Pershing's feeling toward Blacks and the poor performance of the 92nd Division. He also served as Pershing's aide when the general was Army Chief of Staff and investigated some of the mobilization issues that plagued the A.E.F., noting that one of the contributing factors was the "excessive drafting of colored troops."[21] Later as Army Chief of Staff in World War II, Marshall maintained that the Army could not ignore the attitudes of society (meaning segregation) toward "negroes" nor participate in "experiments" in integration as they would be dangerous to "efficiency, discipline, and morale."[22] While Marshall was paternalistic toward Blacks, he nonetheless viewed African Americans as less capable soldiers and more suited to duties as laborers or service on the home front replacing White soldiers that the Army could then send into combat.[23]

Influenced by their WWI combat experience, White officers conducting post-war studies concluded that Black soldiers were better suited for non-combat duties and that the use of Black combat formations in the last war was an experiment that required more study. If conditions warranted, the Army could form Black combat units, but preferably no larger than regimental size. Moreover, the Army should only create African American divisions if it ran out of White divisions and then only after extensive training. Under no circumstances should a Black artillery unit support a White unit because any "short rounds" would be blamed on the Black unit, regardless of fault, and prejudice the morale of the White infantry. On the eve of World War II, a 1940 Army War College study captured the essence of the Army's attitude toward African Americans in general and Black soldiers specifically. It concluded that "the negro's physical, mental, moral, and other psychological characteristics have made it impossible for him to associate socially with any except the lowest class of Whites. The only exceptions to this are the negro concubines who have sometimes attracted men who, except for this association, were considered high class. This social inequality makes the close association of Whites and Blacks in military organization inimicable[sic] to harmony and efficiency."[24]

More than anything else, this prejudicial attitude drove the Army's thinking on the creation of African American combat units. In essence, the Army attempted to navigate the narrow political space between its collective belief about the disutility of Black soldiers and that of

advocates who called for greater equality throughout the military. This political push came from Black leaders and White advocates like Congressman Hamilton Fish, who served with the 369th Infantry Regiment in WWI. They challenged the Army to form Black combat and other units at a rate proportionate to their size of the whole population and avoid shunting Blacks into service outfits exclusively. Not only was confining Blacks to service units a potential misuse of good fighting men, but it only served to perpetuate the second-class social, economic, intellectual, and political status of Blacks in America. Moreover, it undercut the Double V Campaign, a public consciousness campaign that sought to help America win the war against fascism abroad while winning the war against racism at home. To prove that Blacks were equal to Whites, African American leaders argued that if Blacks were 10 percent of the population, they should make up 10 percent of the Army and fill at least 10 percent of each formation.

During a Cabinet meeting on 13 September 1940, President Roosevelt articulated this desire and the next day General Marshall dutifully directed Brigadier General William E. Shedd, the Army G-1 or Chief Personnel Officer, to prepare a summary of the Army's ability to comply with the President's directive.[25] Two weeks later at a meeting with Black political leaders including A. Phillip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, which Roosevelt unintentionally recorded, he reiterated his position, "we are not, as you saw so much in the World War, confining the Negro into the non-combat services. We're putting 'em right in, proportionally, into the combat services." To the question of African Americans having "their own divisions and regiments, and the opportunity to prove their value," FDR suggested that White and Black regiments "in the same division" and artillery batteries working near each other would coalesce organically. "After a while, in case of war, those people get shifted from one to the other. The thing gets sort of backed into. You have one battery out of a regiment of artillery, ah, that would be a Negro battery, with a White battery at the end, maybe a nearby battery, and, and, gradually working in the field together, you may back into it."[26]

Broadly speaking, General Marshall supported the President's position, but drew the line at combining White and Black units (platoons, companies, batteries, battalions, and regiments) side-by-side in the same combat formations. On 16 October 1940, the War Department published its "Policy in regard to Negroes" in which it stated the intention to enlist Blacks proportionately and establish Black units in each of the major organizations, both combat and non-combat. In essence, the Army agreed to comply with the President's wishes, but did so in a curious manner.[27]

History Upended

Understanding that integration of the races within the same unit was anathema, the Army formed separate African American units. At the largest level, the Army resurrected the two Black World War I Infantry divisions—the 92nd and 93rd Divisions—and one Cavalry division (2nd Cavalry Division) out of a total 89 established and deployed. White officers led the divisions, which were filled with African American infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer, and other units according to its table of organization. In planning for their deployment, the Army decided to conduct an

experiment to see if either division's black soldiers could perform well in combat. The 93rd Division received only normal pre-deployment training before sailing to Guadalcanal in the Pacific from January – March 1944, where its regiments and units were parceled out to various islands and, aside from some minor clearing operations, performed labor, stevedore, and general security duties for the rest of the war.[28] The 92nd Division, of WWI infamy, received additional training before sailing to North Africa and on to Naples, Italy in August 1944. Its lead element, the 370th Infantry Regiment, joined the First Armored Division where it fought well near the Arno River against retreating German units. As the Germans settled in behind the Gothic Line, however, the 370th and now the remainder of the Division began to falter. Poor leadership, beginning with the White commander, Major General Edward Almond, a lack of Black replacements, and pervasive racism plagued the division and took a toll on its combat effectiveness.[29] Completely reorganized in March 1945, the Division converted some of its Black infantry regiments to service units, while assuming command of the 473rd Infantry Regiment, a White infantry regiment created by the in-theater conversion of several antiaircraft battalions, and the famed 442nd Infantry Regiment (*Nisei*), consisting of Japanese American soldiers. Apparently, commanders in Italy hoped that White antiaircraft troops and Asians would make better combat troops than Blacks.[30] The 2nd Cavalry Division was originally a racially mixed formation with the 4th Brigade consisting of African American soldiers from some of the oldest and proudest cavalry regiments in the Regular Army. The Army activated it on 1 April 1941 at Fort Riley, Kansas, but lacking any actual requirement for a horse-mounted division, inactivated it as a division on 15 July 1942. The Army retained the 4th Brigade and used it as the nucleus of the new 2nd Cavalry Division (Colored) in February 1943. In March 1944, the Army deployed the division to Oran in North Africa where on 10 May 1944 it was inactivated, and its personnel used to create service units.[31]

As for equality with Whites in units below division-level, Army policy in the late 1930s stated that it would not mobilize Blacks into combat arms (e.g., infantry, cavalry, artillery, and by inference armor or antiaircraft) battalions. Instead, it would create Black infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments, but limit them to the General Headquarters (GHQ) Reserve, essentially consigning them to the rear area, reducing their exposure to combat, and segregating them from the larger White force. However, the policy had no such prohibition about creating Black service (e.g., quartermaster, truck, port, stevedore, or engineer) battalions and was the bureaucratic embodiment of the separate and unequal attitude toward Black soldiers.[32]

After much pressure from Black political leaders and the President, the Army yielded and established several Black antiaircraft, field artillery, tank destroyer, and armor battalions and regiments. But as Judge William Hastie, an assistant to the Secretary of War for Negro Affairs, noted, the Army created these units as a special category of combat outfit that could operate independently and generally separate from White formations.[33] He went on to state that "these original Negro combat units have been the problem children of the Army for more than two years, not because they were incompetent, but because no one wanted them. . . . the utilization of Negro Antiaircraft units in the theater of operations was adopted as the device best calculated

to confound the critics of Army policy as to Negro combat troops without basically changing that policy."[34] More succinctly, the Army employed, and, for political purposes, counted Black men as combatants, while scrupulously maintaining not only their unit's racial integrity, but also their segregation from White units. Some of these units deployed overseas and fought well. The Army and theater commanders, however, treated most as they did the 93rd Division and either assigned these units to non-combat duties or, as with the host of converted battalions, transformed them into service units later in the war. In fairness, as the war continued into 1944, the Army converted both White and Black combat battalions deemed ancillary to the war effort into non-combat and service units. In that year alone, the Army converted 254 battalions of all types, including 18 antiaircraft and 5 barrage balloon battalions and 32 separate antiaircraft batteries. Of the 254 battalions, 43 (or 17 percent), a disproportionate number, were Black; 211 were White.[35] Of the original 41 Black antiaircraft battalions activated by the Army, only 16 finished the war as AAA units.[36]

While this accounting demonstrably makes the point about military segregation, the discovery of the Army's July 1945 Station List of all "Colored" units demolishes any claim of equality or equal distribution of Blacks across combat, combat support, and service units.[37]



A Station List is a list of units by location. The Army kept monthly records, generally by theater. In June 1945, 73.4 percent of African Americans serving in the Army were overseas compared with 63.4 percent of the Army's total strength.[38] The Black units in the United States were not combat units, indeed several were bands and small detachments. A count of Black personnel in the Army Ground Forces, owner of all US-based combat troops, shows no African-American combat soldiers and just 2,671 service troops as of June 1945.[39] An analysis of the

150-page document confirms that not "the bulk" or "a majority," but virtually all African Americans ended the war in service units. First, as previously mentioned, theater commanders converted some units—infantry regiments, antiaircraft battalions, and others—to non-combat duties. Second, ninety-five percent of all Black units deployed overseas were in service units.[40]

Third, when one looks beyond infantry, armor, and artillery outfits, to units often assumed to be "combat" units by their nomenclature—engineers, aviators—and examines those units by their Table of Organization and Equipment, only a few Black engineer units (15 of 325) were combat engineers or bridging units, and only 4 Black aviation units actually flew airplanes. Most drove trucks that moved the unit's support equipment. Indeed, page after page of this Station List showed African American truck companies, salvage battalions, laundry and bath detachments, stevedores, and supply units. And while their contribution in backbreaking service and support tasks was critical to the war effort, digging ditches, unloading ships, or driving supply trucks (even the famed "Red Ball Express") does not make for rousing historical narrative, nor did it change the view of most White soldiers about the value of Black soldiers.



	Combat Units	Combat Support Units	Service Units	Rmks
COAST ARTILLERY	3			
TANK DESTROYER	3			
ARMORED	3			
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE		4		
FIELD ARTILLERY	11			
MISCELLANEOUS			11	
INFANTRY	11		4	
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY	19			
MILITARY POLICE		23		
ADJUTANT GENERAL			27	
CHEMICAL WARFARE	15		21	Smoke
SIGNAL		41		
AIR (ARMY AIR FORCES)	4		39	Ftr Sq
MEDICAL			69	
ORDNANCE			159	
ENGINEERS	14		309	Cbt/Pont
TRANSPORTATION			389	
QUARTERMASTER			1651	
	83	68	2679	

Combat Makes Christians of Us All

Given the influence of segregation on their Army experience, it is not surprising that Black soldiers, more than their White counterparts, focused more on equality than on winning the war. In March 1943, when asked "Do you think this war is as much your affair as it is anybody else's?" a cross-section of White and Black Soldiers matched by education, region of origin, and branch of service responded "Yes" 86 % (Whites) and 66 % (Blacks) respectively. When asked if they were "fighting to protect free speech for everyone," White soldiers responded very positively

(90%); Blacks less so (70%). When polled about what they might ask the President, 50% of African American soldiers said they would ask about racial discrimination; less than 0.5 percent of White soldiers responded similarly. Finally, and importantly, to the question, "Do you think that most Negroes are being given a fair chance to do as much as they want to help win the war?," The majority of Blacks said, "No"; White soldiers saw things very differently, responding overwhelmingly, "Yes".[41] This vast difference in perception clearly stemmed from preconceived ideas about the worthiness of Black soldiers, their purposeful segregation, and the task or duty separation that limited the ability of Black and White soldiers to interact in a meaningful manner.



This perspective carried over to how African Americans thought about serving in the same outfit or unit as Whites. Of 3,000 Blacks surveyed in March 1943, 37% indicated that "they should be in separate outfits," while 36% opted to "be together in the same outfits." Of that latter group, 20% voiced either statements about democracy and equality (15%), or a belief that closer association would bring improved understanding between the races (5%). Similarly, of those Blacks opting for separate outfits, 13% indicated it was due to the existence of prejudice that drove their choice. In other words, if the prejudice did not exist, they might have chosen for "same outfit" instead.

When researchers asked that same question of 4,800 White enlisted men, 84% responded that they wanted to be in separate outfits; only 12% stated that Blacks and Whites should serve in mixed units together. Some (14%), however, qualified their "separate" vote by including

statements suggesting that expediency during wartime drove their belief, seven percent of whom were concerned that intermingling would lead to friction and trouble.[42]

Researchers conducted these surveys of men who were out of combat and in some cases had not yet deployed overseas. After being in close combat, indeed fighting for their very lives side-by-side with Black soldiers, White opinions changed significantly. Three examples from the campaign against Germany in Northern European show how White soldiers went from *Admiring* Black soldiers in the performance of their duties in Normandy to *Desiring* their assistance during the Battle of the Bulge to *Requiring* their help afterward to stay alive and win the war.[43]

Stage of Acceptance	Example
Admiring	"Look at those fellas hustle"
Desiring	"Could you drop some artillery on this target?"
Requiring	"We are running out of infantry; any volunteers?"



Admiring: Take for example the experience of White infantrymen and others watching the Black men of the 320th Anti-Aircraft Barrage Balloon Battalion, VLA (Very Low Altitude), operating on Omaha and Utah Beaches. The 320th Battalion was one of four Black Barrage Balloon battalions and the only battalion of its type (White or Black) to deploy to combat, not once, but twice, first to Normandy on D-Day, June 6, 1944, within four hours of the assault, and then to the Pacific. The men of this battalion were the first Black soldiers and the first Black combat unit to

set foot in France. Their mission was to float several thirty-five-foot-long balloons or "silver sausages" to an altitude of 2000 feet and create an aerial hazard to either snare unsuspecting enemy aircraft or force them to higher altitudes where Army antiaircraft units or pursuit planes could engage them. Despite being under continuous artillery and machine gun fire, the Battalion got their balloons aloft, sometimes grabbing the wire tether and maneuvering them by hand.

Along with the other Black Balloon battalions, the 320th Battalion was a "source of tremendous pride for black America" and received frequent coverage in the African American and White press. When it left France after 140 days, the 320th had destroyed one JU-88 and possibly two other German aircraft, and received a commendation from General Eisenhower for its service at Omaha Beach. Moreover, the 320th captured the attention of servicemen across Europe and changed some, if not all, minds about the ability of African-American soldiers. As Bill Richardson, a military correspondent on Eisenhower's staff, noted, "It seems the whole front knows the story of the Negro barrage balloon battalion outfit which was one of the first ashore on D-Day. [They] have gotten the reputation of hard workers and good soldiers. Their simple earnestness and pride . . . [are] obvious to some of the most Jim-Crow-conscious southerners."[44]



One Black soldier, however, beat even the first Black balloon crew to Normandy. Corporal Waverly Woodson, Jr., a medic from Philadelphia, was temporarily detached from his battalion and assigned to an early arriving Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) with the 29th Infantry Division to treat wounded soldiers regardless of color. As Woodson's LCT approached Omaha Beach around 9:00 AM, it struck a mine that disabled the motor and hit another mine that tore into the hull. An

artillery round then landed in the jeep on deck, killing several men. Woodson suffered shrapnel wounds to the leg, his first of two, and soon found himself struggling to get out of the frigid water and ashore. Once on the fire-swept beach, he quickly set up an aid station and treated 200 wounded and dying soldiers. Even after being relieved at 4:00 P.M. on 7 June after 30 hours of continuous action, he gave artificial respiration to three white soldiers who had gone underwater during their attempt to land their LCT before collapsing from his wounds and sheer exhaustion.[45]

Woodson's battalion commander, a White officer, recommended him for the Distinguished Service Cross, the nation's second highest award. U.S. Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, believed Woodson deserved the Congressional Medal of Honor and ordered the recommendation revised. Records indicate that the award even reached the White House, but it is lost to history whether the recommendation ever crossed President Roosevelt's desk. Woodson's personnel records burned in a 1973 fire at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis.

In recent years some Black men have been belatedly honored, but during World War II Black men did not receive the Medal of Honor. Of the 433 Medals of Honor awarded during the war, none went to African-American soldiers. In the end, Woodson received the Bronze Star, the nation's fourth-highest award for valor. Years later, when talking about racial relations and his service on Omaha Beach, Woodson remarked that when men needed aid, "they didn't care what color my skin was."[46]

No doubt the same feeling existed among other White combat units. Certainly, White infantrymen and tankers appreciated the labor of Black (and White) men culled from across the force to serve as truck drivers in the Red Ball Express that provided desperately needed fuel, ammunition, and supplies to forward combat forces as they chased German units across the Seine River following the breakout from Normandy. This situation was another case where White combat troops in the forward areas could appreciate and admire the work done by Blacks and others, but did not necessarily need to interact with them in a meaningful way.

Desiring: The strict segregation of African American soldiers and units began to change as combat extended beyond Normandy and approached the German border in the latter part of 1944. Combat conditions in December 1944 in the Ardennes gave rise to the need for greater integration of units, but not necessarily individual personnel. Indeed, the exigencies of close combat against the German attack that started on 16 December drove Black and White artillery units closer together than ever before.

In spring 1945, there were 238 separate field artillery battalions in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) out of a total of 307 deployed worldwide; nine of those battalions were Black and all were in the ETO.[47] Those nine African American artillery battalions, less than three percent of those in Europe and less than four percent of the total, represented the largest concentration of African American combat power in a single theater of war. Their mere existence and inclusion in combat operations underscored the American preference for overwhelming

firepower. For when it came to the desire pummel the Germans with devastating artillery fire, the Army set aside its pre-war concern about having Black battalions and batteries provide artillery fire support for White troops and prioritized its tactical ethos.

Army artillery support occurred at several levels, the first and most direct support came from the artillery battalions assigned permanently to an Army division. The next most proximate support came from a battalion or often several battalions attached to an Army division. The third level of support occurred when one or more battalions, often under the command of an artillery group, reinforced the fires of a division's organic artillery battalions. Given the pre-war Army's taboo against integrating Black and White units within the division, all nine African American artillery battalions were assigned to Corps artillery commands and organized as part of field artillery groups to reinforce the fires of assigned or attached artillery battalions.

In most cases, Black artillery battalions fought as part of White artillery groups commanded by and consisting of White men. However, several times in the war White artillery battalions worked under the command of a Black artillery group led by Black officers. And while this mixture of Black and White battalions occurred episodically in Europe, nowhere was this level of unit integration more necessary or the ability of Black and White units to cooperate more critical than during the Battle of the Bulge at the siege of Bastogne.



The winter of 1944 was one of the coldest in nearly 40 years. Ice cold rain turned dirt roads into rivers of mud that stopped vehicles in their tracks and then froze them in place when the temperature dropped. As the Allied armies approached Germany, the Ardennes forest, covered in a thick blanket of snow held in place by sub-zero temperatures, was one of the worst. In May

1940, the Germans attacked through the so-called impenetrable Ardennes, overwhelmed a surprised French force, and reached the English Channel in weeks. In December 1944, Hitler intended to repeat the feat, slicing through a weakly defended area of the Allied line, destroy the U.S. 1st and 9th Armies and the British 21st Army Group, and recapture the port of Antwerp.

At 5:30 A.M. on a dark, misty December 16, the first of up to 27 German armor and infantry divisions, 200,000 men in total, attacked across a 60-mile front catching 83,000 men in six untested or refitting American divisions, most belonging to the VIII U.S. Corps, completely by surprise.[48] Over the next three days, American divisions managed to hold the northern and southern shoulders and delay the German main thrust in the center. While bitter combat occurred throughout the salient, the battle devolved into an all-out fight in the very compartmented terrain to hold bridges and major road junctions, in particular, the junction of several major roads at Bastogne.



In December 1944, VIII Corps divisions received reinforcing artillery fires from several organizations including the 333rd Field Artillery Group (Colored). The 333rd FA Group consisted of two Black artillery battalions, the 333rd FA Battalion and the 969th FA Battalion, both equipped with twelve 155-mm howitzers, and 771st FA Battalion, a White battalion armed with 4.5-inch guns. Over 16 and 17 December, the German onslaught overran elements of the 106th Infantry Division and portions of the 333rd FA Battalion supporting it and drove them to the west. In the process of retreating, the 333rd FA Battalion lost seven of its guns and the majority of soldiers, 11 of whom men from the German *1st SS Panzer Division* massacred.[49]

Meanwhile, Eisenhower sent one of his two theater reserve divisions, the 101st Airborne Division, three weeks removed from the failed attempt to bounce the Rhine in Operation Market Garden to Bastogne to hold the vital road junction and slow, if not stop, the German attack in the center of the Bulge. To reinforce the division's own artillery, VIII Corps placed the 333rd FA Group headquarters, and the 969th FA and 771st FA Battalions under the command of the 101st Division Artillery led by Brig Gen Anthony McAuliffe, who by happenstance was also the acting division commander as Maj Gen Maxwell Taylor was out of the area.[50]

As the 101st Airborne Division moved by truck to Bastogne, the Germans attacked from the east, north, and south, forcing American units to retreat toward the town. By 20 December, the 333rd FA Battalion, having suffered a direct attack by German panzers, had lost two additional howitzers, for a 4-day total of 9 guns, 34 trucks, 12 weapons carriers, six officers, and 222 men, either as casualties or prisoners. The remnants of the battalion folded into the 969th FA Bn, the other Black artillery battalion, now in the vicinity of Bastogne. Concurrently, direct German pressure on the White cannoneers of the 771st FA Battalion drove most of the soldiers off, leaving just six officers and 14 soldiers to man two of their 4.5-inch guns. The 969th FA Bn took control of these guns, creating a composite battalion, and the 20 remaining men of the 771st FA Bn joined the 333rd Field Artillery Group headquarters. By the afternoon of 21 December, with Bastogne now surrounded, the 969th FA Battalion was the only medium artillery to back up the Division's light 105-mm howitzers inside the half-mile wide defensive perimeter.[51]

From 21-26 December, the German's completely surrounded Bastogne. Some of the artillerymen were within 500 yards of the front lines. Artillery rounds, however, were in such short supply that the 969th FA Bn only fired on targets called in by observers. Not surprisingly, the infantrymen defending the town did not stop to ask what color the cannoneers were when asking for artillery protection. They just asked for help.

Despite the shortages and the constant German artillery, armor, and infantry attacks, cooperation between men and units was superb. Soldiers from the 969th FA Bn recovered abandoned vehicles, carried messages under fire, and evacuated wounded individuals to aid stations. Several men received the Bronze Star for their actions. Some men, identifying with the way Airborne soldiers wore their uniforms, began tucking their pant legs into their boots. One enterprising 969th cook, Technician 4 Broman Williams, even set up an improvised mess and fed a thousand men, White and Black, daily. Like the men Waverly Woodson treated at Omaha Beach, the tired, cold, and hungry men of Bastogne did not care who prepared the food as long as it was hot.[52]

Just before Christmas, C-47 aircraft began dropping precious supplies and ammunition. At 4:50 pm on 26 December, the first tank from the 4th Armored Division attacking from the south, pierced the German lines and entered Bastogne. Before dawn on 27 December, American forces had cleared both sides of the road leading to town sufficiently that now had a relatively secure path to resupply and succor the 101st Airborne Division in the tough fighting that followed.[53]

On 3 January 1945, Maj Gen Taylor, who had arrived with lead elements of the 4th Armored Division and resumed command of the 101st Airborne Division, wrote to Lt Col Hubert D. Barnes, commander of the 969th FA Battalion, thanking them for their "gallant support" in defense of Bastogne, attributing the success to the "shoulder-to-shoulder cooperation of all units involved." He closed by noting that he was recommending the battalion for the Distinguished Unit Citation.[54] On 11 January, Maj Gen Troy Middleton, commander of VIII Corps, wrote "Your contribution to the great success of our arms at Bastogne will take its place among the epic achievements of our Army."[55]

The 969th Field Artillery Battalion would leave Bastogne for on 16 January to support French and American divisions in the 7th U.S. Army in the reduction of the Colmar pocket in the Vosges Mountains. In February, along with units of the 101st Division, the Battalion received the Distinguished Unit Citation. It was the second Black unit to receive the award.[56] In its ten months in combat, the 969th Field Artillery Battalion fired 42,289 rounds in support of units in all four American Armies and the French Army. On 3 May 1945, the Battalion was reunited with the 101st Airborne Division, this time supporting the infantrymen by trucking German prisoners to the 101st Division's POW stockades.[57]



L: Members of the 101st Airborne Division bring in a supply bundle.
R: The crew of this 155-mm howitzer has just received ammunition from the glider in the background. This incident occurred during the siege of Bastogne and likely depicts men of the 969th FA Battalion in combat.

Source: S. L. A. Marshall, *Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days,* (Washington, DC: Center for Army History, 1988), 248.

Requiring: Since the relatively light losses during the Normandy landings, American casualties had increased dramatically. Hedgerow fighting had decimated infantry divisions, in some cases resulting in almost 100% loss of infantrymen. By 8 December 1944, Patton's Third U.S. Army was short 11,000 infantrymen, the equivalent of 55 rifle companies or enough riflemen to fill two infantry divisions and Eisenhower's manpower specialists predicted the two major American forces, Bradley's 12th Army Group and Devers's 6th Army Group, would need over 29,000 infantry replacements by the end of the month. The German attack in the Ardennes made a mockery of those estimates.[58]

Hitler's desperate gamble to knock the Allies out of the war in the west failed miserably, but caused over 79,000 American casualties and drove the Army to rush replacements from the States and rear area White units. In a bit of inspired leadership, Lt Gen J. C. H. Lee, the commander of American service troops in England who had earlier recommended Waverly Woodson for the Medal of Honor, approached Eisenhower with the idea to take volunteer Black support troops into the infantry. Already planning to release up to 20,000 White men to undertake infantry and armor training, Lee now wanted to tap his reserves of Black manpower. He had coordinated with Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, then Special Advisor and Coordinator to the Theater Commander on Negro Troops, and Brigadier General Henry Marchett, Commander of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, who supported the idea. Lee had even drafted a message to be read to African Americans throughout his command asking them to volunteer, and take a reduction in rank to Private and Private First Class, to fight as individual infantry replacements on the front lines.

His initial proposal for Black support troops to integrate into White units on an individual basis, however, ran afoul of Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen Walter Bedell Smith. "Beetle" Smith, as he was known, argued that to follow Lee's suggestion would not only violate Army policy, but it would also encourage Blacks and their patrons to push for an end to segregation in the Army. Eisenhower, as was his way, found a middle ground, rewrote Lee's message personally, and issued a request "to all soldiers without regard to color or race" to volunteer for combat assignments.[59]

While originally limited to 2,500 African Americans, 4,562 men came forward, eventually forming 37 overstrength Black rifle platoons, led by White officers and platoon sergeants. At the 16th Reinforcement Depot at Compiegne, France, these men received the same training White men had been undertaking since November 1944. The training staff noted that Black units had fewer absentees and fewer disciplinary problems than non-volunteer White soldiers. After the very modest infantry training concluded, Eisenhower's headquarters sent 25 platoons to General Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group, which detailed them to the First and Ninth Armies and further down through corps to Army divisions, where they fought side by side with White platoons in integrated infantry companies. The other 12 platoons went to 6th Army Group and down to the Seventh Army, where they formed into Black companies and fought in White battalions. A bit later, a second group of 16 platoons arrived with 12 going to the 12th Army Group and four to

the 6th Army Group. These units remained infantry outfits until the war ended, where upon the Army either returned them to their service-unit headquarters or discharged them. The platoons and companies, particularly in the 12th Army Group, won praise from their commanders and from White men in their units.[60]

In the 12th Army Group, which had faced the brunt of the recent German attack, their gaining organizations did their best to welcome the arrival of the Black platoons. Division and assistant division commanders personally greeted them upon arrival and in some instances platoons received the division patch and a brief history of the division and regiment they were joining. As for their distribution, the platoons joined both veteran units (1st and 9th Infantry Divisions) and newer units like the 12th and 14th Armored Divisions and the 69th, 78th, 99th, and 104th Infantry Divisions. At least one division not immediately on the offensive put their platoons through additional training. As the assistant division commander of the 104th Division noted, "we wanted to make sure they knew all the tricks of infantry fighting. We assigned our best combat leaders as instructors. I watched those lads training and if ever men were in dead earnest, they were."[61]

The 104th Division was rewarded for the efforts. A divisional report noted, "their combat record has been outstanding. They have, without exception, proven themselves to be good soldiers." The Division G-1 (Personnel officer) told Brigadier General Davis during an inspection trip: "Morale: Excellent. Manner of performance: Superb. Men are very eager to close with the enemy and to destroy him. Strict attention to duty, aggressiveness, common sense, and judgment under fire has won the admiration of all the men in the company. . . . the men of Company F all agree that the colored platoon has a caliber of men equal to any veteran platoon."[62]

Black platoons assigned to the 9th and 1st Infantry Divisions were just as effective. One soldier, Private First Class Jack Thomas, received the Distinguished Service Cross, second only to the Medal of Honor, for his actions with the 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division. In the 1st Infantry Division, the most bloodied and experienced division in the Army, the platoons joined the regiments that landed in North Africa and stormed the beach on D-Day. As they fought side-by-side, the platoons' proficiency climbed dramatically from 30% to 80% in two weeks. When casualties dropped one platoon's strength for it to continue as a separate unit, the remaining men joined a White platoon as an infantry squad. In another platoon, when the White platoon sergeant was wounded, a Black infantryman stepped forward, worked closely with the other White platoon sergeants and leaders, and performed "all duties . . . in a superior manner." More directly, a White platoon sergeant from South Carolina said, "When I heard about it, I said I'd be damned if I'd wear the same shoulder patch they did. After that first day when we waw how they fought, I changed my mind. They are just like any of the other boys to us." In so integrating at all but the individual soldier level, these men erased centuries of discrimination, bigotry, and racism.[63]



In June 1945, a month after the war in Europe ended, the Army surveyed White company officers, platoon sergeants, and other enlisted men to determine their reaction to fighting in integrated units. The officers, sergeants, and men noted that African American soldiers performed well with 84% of the White officers and 81% of the sergeants and enlisted men responding, "very well" and 16% and 17% responding "fairly well," respectively. Stated another way, 100% of the officers and 98% of the enlisted men responded positively that Blacks, fighting side-by-side, had performed well. When asked if "with the same Army training and experience, how do you think colored troops would compare with White troops as Infantry soldiers?," 86% of White officers and 92% of White platoon sergeants and men said, "just the same" or "better than White troops." Still almost all officers and men felt that if the Army continued to use Black soldiers as Infantrymen, it should do so in separate platoons, companies, or even battalions.[64]

In a way, while touting the fighting ability of Black soldiers, these responses confirmed the "equal" and "separate" policies espoused by the Army and American society at the time. While an emergency action during war, the integration of Black platoons into White Infantry units nonetheless represented a small, if belated, step forward for actual equality. From *admiring* to *desiring* to *requiring* the support of outsiders to win the war, White infantrymen and others gradually came to accept the integration of African American soldiers when their lives depended on it. And as Roosevelt predicted in 1940, the "backed into it."

In 1948, President Harry Truman ordered the military to integrate, but it would take the Korean War to drive the Army to do eliminate separate African American units. But change is

hard and changing attitudes and perceptions even harder. It would take a few more decades before the Army truly integrated Blacks into all levels of the force from individual squad members to 3-and 4-star commanders and longer before the Defense Department promoted them to positions like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense.

* * *

Conclusion

So, what does the Case of the Missing WWII Black Combat Soldier teach us about diversity, equity, and inclusion?

Warfare has always been and will remain a human affair. Despite ever-present improvements in technology and their influence on the current and future conduct of war, the last two decades of conflict in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan (and now Ukraine) only reaffirm what T.R. Fehrenbach, author of *This Kind of War*, wrote after the Korean War; "You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, and wipe it clean of life--but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did—by putting your soldiers in the mud."[65]

The problem in World War II and the problem now is that America faces a shortage of qualified personnel to populate its Armed Forces. Recent reports highlight the dearth of American teenagers capable of meeting the Defense Department's intellectual, physical, and moral standards for service. Out of 31.8 million military-aged youth, 9.1 million meet the *minimum* physical, mental, educational, aptitudinal, and legal and drug use qualifications, but only 435,000 are of high academic quality and are interested in military service.[66] Moreover,

civilian corporations worldwide are competing for the same shrinking pool of high school and college graduates. Given this situation, the American military, both as a corporate business and as a combat organization, can ill-afford to treat potential employees with disdain, discriminate against them, or exclude them because they are different—in race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexual preference.

In World War II, the U.S. military systematically discriminated against African Americans, shunted those it allowed to serve into non-combat roles, and believed that winning the war was a job for White men only. In the end, particularly in Europe, where the Wehrmacht chewed up battalion after battalion of American GIs in epic defensive battles from Normandy to the Rhine, the American Army ran out of fighting White men and had to rush in a hasty infusion of companies and platoons of volunteers from Black Army Service Forces units to succor the front lines and continue the fight. This emergency inclusion of African American troops fighting side-by-side with White infantrymen changed attitudes about the fighting abilities and value of Black servicemen and set the stage for the 1948 Presidential directive to integrate the Armed Forces.

Today's force must not repeat the same mistakes and must capitalize on our national diversity and include individuals from all communities into the defense establishment if we are to maximize our intellectual and physical abilities to defend the nation and ensure our continued prosperity. This essay highlighted the systematic discrimination against Blacks in World War II and how the perception of Black servicemen changed as White men began to associate with them and gradually include them in their combat space, ultimately integrating African American service troops among White battalions and companies in the later stages of the European campaign. The lessons this offers for diversity and inclusion suggest that:

a. exclusion builds resentment and allows it to continue; inclusion breaks that resentment down;

b. the stigma of exclusion is both projected upon and often accepted by those stigmatized, resulting at times in self-fulfilling actions that only reinforce the perception of the validity of segregation,[67]

c. demand-side" models based on gross population numbers (like 10%) are not as effective as "supply-side" efforts that provide avenues of equal opportunity for everyone to demonstrate their value;

d. actions speak louder than words; advocates for the creation of African-American combat forces helped initiate steps that led to Black troops being available in Europe and elsewhere, but the act of fighting together, of placing Black platoons and companies within White units created the opportunity for change to take root; and

e. the assumptions a majority makes about a minority are often wrong; that when placed together and given the necessity to interact, attitudes can and will change.

[1]House of Representatives, "The Negro Soldier," Extension of Remarks by Honorable Helen Gahagan Douglas (CA), February 1, 1946, *Congressional Record,* A429, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1946-pt9/summary (accessed February 20, 2020).

[2]Michael Lee Lanning, *The African-American Soldier: From Crispus Attucks to Colin Powell,* (Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group, 1997), 173.

[3]African-American figure from National World War II Museum website, https://nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-military-numbers (accessed March 5, 2020).

[4]While one will find occasional discussion of African Americans and women where appropriate throughout the Army's multivolume history of World War II, both groups have separate volumes devoted to in-depth coverage of their contributions and the policies surrounding them. See Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops,* and Maddie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps.* The terms "subordination, superordination, and disequilibrated" are drawn from Shirley Star, Robin Williams, and Samuel Stouffer, Chapter 10, "Negro Soldiers" in Stouffer, Ed Suchman, Leland DeVinney, Star, and Williams, *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life,* Vol I, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 486-487, hereafter referred to as Stouffer, et al, "Negro Soldiers."

[5]Robert K. Griffith, Jr., *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army Between the Wars,* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 212.

[6]The name "Borinqueños" came from the Puerto Rican islands original name of Boriken, meaning Land of the Brave People, created by the Taino-Arawak people, a highly advanced race dating back to 4,000 B.C.

[7]Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops,* Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 415.

[8]In December 1945, the Army had 367,630 enlisted African Americans on the rolls out of a total of 3,572,577 enlisted men (10.29%). When officers are added, the percentage drops to 8.81%. Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops,* 415.

[9]www.nationalww2.org/assets/pdfs/african-americas-inworld.pdf

[10]Stouffer, et al, "Negro Soldiers," 495.

[11]An analysis of the Shelby L. Stanton, *Order of Battle U.S. Army WWII*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), 482-510, and other sources indicates the Army formed 41 African American AAA or Coast Artillery (AA) Battalions. Stanton denotes 36 (CLD) or (Colored) antiaircraft battalions. A search of AA Command General Orders, AA Command and ETO Station Lists, and other sources uncovered 5 additional African-American Antiaircraft Battalions—the 207th, 208th, 393rd, and 897th Automatic Weapons Battalions and the 503rd Gun Battalion. By type, they were: 4 Barrage Balloon; 22 Automatic Weapons (Semimobile); 11 Gun (Semimobile); 4 Searchlight. There were also 3 Coast Artillery 155mm Gun Battalions, which fell under the Coast Artillery, but were not antiaircraft battalions. Not all of these units deployed. As discussed later, the Army converted a portion of these units to Quartermaster and Service units and disbanded others. Stanton's Order of Battle lists 600 different AAA Battalions, including one battalion twice. The

200th Separate CA Bn (AA) formed at Fort Bliss, Texas on 20 Jan 1943 was later redesignated as the 400th Separate CA Bn (AA) (AW). Thus, there were really only 599 AAA Battalions formed during the war. As for other men of color, at least one of these battalions, 123rd AAA Gun Bn, was made up of men from Puerto Rico.

[12]The AAA units were the 234th, 235th, 319th, 321st, 393rd, 394th, 458th, 492nd, 493rd, 538th, 790th, 819th, and 846th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions. Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops,* 425. The Army refilled or reestablished the 234th, which ultimately deployed to the Pacific, ending the war in Saipan, but saw no air action.

[13]There is a common saying among military historians, "If you want to understand the military today, look back twenty years."

[14]Elliot V. Converse, III; Daniel K. Gibran; John A. Cash; Robert K. Griffith, Jr; and Richard H. Kohn, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers from the Medal of Honor in World War II,* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc, Publishers, 1997), 23. Hereafter noted as Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers*.

[15]Bernard C. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military,* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 114-117; Ballou quote from page 115; Bullard quote on page 117. Also, see Coffman, *The War to End all Wars,* 314-320; For more on Bullard, see Allan R. Millett, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the U.S. Army, 1881-1925,* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), particularly 425-429.

[16]Coffman, *The War to End all Wars,* 233. Casualty figures for all four regiments from Nalty, *Strength for the Fight,* 120.

[17]Quote from Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, 118; background from 117-123. Casualty figures from Peter Nelson, *A More Unbending Battle: The Harlem Hellfighter's Struggle for Freedom in World War I and Equality at Home* (New York: Basic *Civitas* Books, 2009), 213.

[18]"Rainbow" quote from Melissa Ziobro, "The 369th Sustainment Brigade," *Army History,* https://armyhistory.org/369th-sustainment-brigade/ February 2, 1918 (accessed 10 April 1918).

[19]Stanton, *Order of Battle U.S. Army WWII,* 472.

[20]Nalty, *Strength for the Fight,* 117.

[21]Larry I. Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol 1, "The Soldierly Spirit, December 1880 – June 1939,"* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 227.

[22]Nalty, *Strength for the Fight,* Marshall statement, 146-147; Patton characterization, 177.

[23] Perusal of the four volumes of the Papers of George Catlett Marshall confirms this position. The two extremes are visible in volume 2 and volume 4. In volume 2 (page 666), on November 6, 1941, Marshall asks then Colonel Walter Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, to promote his Black horse orderly, noting that "anyone who stays with me loses heavily in rank if he belongs to the negro personnel. It is, therefore, difficult to hold a good man in contentment." In volume 4 (page 151), on October 11, 1943, he asks Lieutenant General Thomas McNarney, Assistant Chief of Staff, why the Army cannot move more negro troops into Washington, DC to replace others [Whites] that he feels should be overseas. Larry I.

Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol 2, "We Cannot Delay: July 1, 1939 — December 6, 1941,* and *vol 4, "Aggressive and Determined Leadership" June 1, 1943 – December 31, 1944,* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 and 1996). The Marshall Papers hereafter referred to as *GCMP,* followed by the volume and page number.

[24]Quoted from Richard J. Stillman, "The Role of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces, 1939-1968," *Irish Defense Journal,* (March 1969): 102-103, cited in Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers,* 26.

[25]Memorandum, Chief of Staff for General Shedd (the G-1), 14 September 1940, CCS 20609-79. "Reports on presidential intention regarding publicizing Black participation in the services" Modern Military Records, NARA II, as cited in Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty eds. *Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents. Volume V: Black Soldiers in World War II,* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 25. Hereafter cited as MacGregor and Nalty, *Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents. Volume V.*

[26]Franklin D. Roosevelt: Transcript of White House Office Conversations, 1940, Collection: FDR White House Transcripts Collection, 8/22/1940 -10/10/1940, FDR-FDRTA, "FDR Meets With Black Leaders. Side 1, 1637 – 1972. September 27, 1940,"
https://catalog.archives.gov/OpaAPI/media/194775/content/arcmedia/media/images/23/4/23-0350a.gif and 23-0351a.gif. See also R. J. C. Butow, "The Story Behind the FDR Tapes," *American Heritage*, vol 33, Issue 2, (Feb – Mar 1982), at https://www.americanheritage.com/story-behind-fdr-tapes#1

[27]Memorandum, The Adjutant General, Subject: War Department policy in regard to Negroes, in Ibid., 32-33; Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops,* 78-79.

[28]Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers,* 32-34; Maggi M. Morehouse, *Fighting in the Jim Crow Army: Black Men and Women Remember World War II,* (Lanham, MD: Rowen & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2000), 135.

[29]For more on the 92nd Division, see Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers* 94-121.

[30]Ibid., and Stanton, *Order of Battle U.S. Army WWII,* 166-168.

[31]Stanton, *Order of Battle U.S. Army WWII*, 23, 166-168. See also Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers*, 35, 22n.

[32]Memorandum, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 for Chief of Staff, 3 June 1940, Subject: Employment of Negro Manpower, Tab A, MacGregor and Nalty, *Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents. Volume V*, 11.

[33]Jeffrey T. Sammons and John H. Morrow, Jr., *Harlem's Rattlers and the Great War: The Undaunted 369th Regiment and the African American Quest for Equality.* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2014), 442.

[34]As cited in Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops,* 480.

[35]Ibid., 426.

[36]Personal count of African-American AAA units listed in "T/O Colored Unites Continental and Foreign as of 7 July 1945, STN-122," (War Department General and Special Staff, G-1) RG 165, Decimal File, 1942 – June 1946, 291.2, Box 443, NARA. Unit conversion description from Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops,* 542.

[37]"T/O Colored Units Continental and Foreign as of 7 July 1945, STN-122," (War Department General and Special Staff, G-1) RG 165, Decimal File, 1942 – June 1946, 291.2, Box 443, NARA.

[38]Stouffer, et al, "Negro Soldiers," 497.

[39]Bell I. Wiley, *The Training of Negro Troops*, Army Ground Forces Study No. 36, (Washington: AGF Historical Section, 1946), 6.

[40]The author acknowledges that not all units are the same size. Also, the author did not attempt to inventory the exact size of every Black unit as of July 1945. Such a task would require access to countless unit records, many which do not exist or only contain fragmentary information.

[41]Stouffer, et al, "Negro Soldiers," 508, 504, 511.

[42]Ibid., 573 - 577.

[43]The following examples are illustrative and not meant to be inclusive of all White and Black relationships in World War II.

[44]Cited in Linda Hervieux, *Forgotten: The Untold Story of D-Day's Black Heroes, at Home and at War,* (New Yor:. Harper, 2015), 238.

[45]Ibid; Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers,* 79-80.

[46]Hervieux, *Forgotten;* Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers,* 80.

[47]Bryan Booker, *African Americans in the United States Army in World War II,* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2008), 113.

[48]Charles B. MacDonald, *The Mighty Endeavor: The American War in Europe,* (New York: William Morrow, 1969), 388-394, 397.

[49]Raymond Bell, Jr., "Black Gunners at Bastogne," *Army* (Nov 2004): 49-53; and Denise George and Robert Child, *The Lost Eleven: The Forgotten Story of Black American Soldiers Brutally Massacred in World War II,* (New York: Caliber, 2017), 272-300. The book's cover mistakenly shows Black soldiers manning a 40-mm Bofors antiaircraft gun. Besides the 320th Barrage Balloon Battalion, the only Black 40-mm antiaircraft battalion in the ETO was the 452nd AAA Automatic Weapons (Mobile) battalion which was part of Patton's Third Army and protected XII Corps artillery units during this period. Although one of the most effective AAA units in Europe, it was not at Bastogne. "452nd AAA Battalion History, 1 January to 31 December 1944," CABN-452-0, 452 AAA AW Bn, NARA.

[50]Bell, "Black Gunners at Bastogne," 51.

[51]Ibid; Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers,* 77-78.

[52]Bell, "Black Gunners at Bastogne," 52-53.

[53]S. L. A. Marshall, *Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days,* (Washington, DC: Center for Army History, 1988), 172.

[54]Cited in both Booker, *African Americans in the United States Army in World War II*, 120 and Bell, "Black Gunners at Bastogne," 50.

[55]Booker, *African Americans in the United States Army in World War II,* 121.

[56]Converse, et al, *The Exclusion of Black Soldiers,* 75-77. The first unit was Third Platoon, Company C, 614th Tank Destroyer Battalion for action on 14 December 1944 near Climbach, France.

[57]Booker, *African Americans in the United States Army in World War II,* 125.

[58]Ibid., 274-275.

[59]Michael Lee Lanning, *The African-American Soldier: From Crispus Attucks to Colin Powell,* (Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group, 1997), 181-182; Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops,* 695-705.

[60]Lanning, 181-182; Lee, 695-705; Booker, 277.

[61]Booker, *African Americans in the United States Army in World War II,* 279.

[62]Ibid.

[63]Ibid., 279-280; Stouffer, et al, "Negro Soldiers," 592.

[64]Stouffer, et al, "Negro Soldiers," 589-591.

[65] T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, Bantam Edition, (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 408. Originally published in 1963.

[66]Data from the Army Marketing Research Group as cited in *Inspired to Serve: The Final Report of the National Commission on Miliary, National, and Public Service,* Report to Congress, March 2020, 32-33, https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Final%20Report%20-%20National%20Commission.pdf .

[67]Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963), 8-9.

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